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THE DRAGON AND THE EAGLE: REFORMING 
CHINA’S SECURITIES IPO LAWS IN THE U.S. 
MODEL, PROS AND CONS 
 
 
Professor Stuart R. Cohn & Professor Miao Yinzhi* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
China is about to undergo a major reform of its securities offering and 
listing processes. Since the inception of China’s securities market in the 
early 1990s, the government has exercised tight control to determine which 
companies will be allowed to engage in initial public offerings and become 
listed on a national exchange. The system has led to both corruption and 
favoritism and has blocked numerable companies from access to capital 
markets. With the ascension in 2013 of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang as the 
heads of the Chinese Communist Party and Premier, the government 
adopted reform of the market process as a major goal within its economic 
program. Under the proposal, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) will no longer have major power over which companies can go 
public, what their offering prices will be or whether or where the issuer’s 
shares will be listed. According to the proposed bill, the CSRC’s role under 
the proposed reform has been substantially reduced. The authority to 
determine whether prospectus disclosure requirements have been met will 
principally move from the CSRC to the stock exchanges, which will also 
determine listing applications. The reform process, announced in November 
2013, has been delayed as a result of China’s stock market crisis in July 
2015. It now appears that the reform measures are back on track. Yet, 
despite a generally favorable attitude towards the reform, significant 
concerns exist among Chinese government officials and academics as to 
whether the open registration system will lead to a more efficient market. 
Unlike the United States, the Chinese securities markets are dominated by 
individual shareholders, many of whom are relatively inexperienced. Nor 
does China have the extensive infrastructure of experienced and trustworthy 
broker-dealers, investment advisors, and enforcement tools that exist in the 
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U.S. Other than the principal reform proposal there are few specific 
regulations currently adopted to address concerns about market access and 
investor protection. This article examines the background leading to the 
reform proposal and analyzes whether and to what extent certain measures 
in the United States might be appropriate for adoption when the open 
registration system becomes reality. 
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INTRODUCTION: A MOVE TOWARDS REFORM 
The Chinese government has historically exercised tight control over the 
securities market through the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(“CSRC”),1 China’s equivalent to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The principal control has been in determining what companies 
will be permitted to engage in public offerings. Whether a company can 
engage in a public offering involves more than meeting the formal 
application and disclosure requirements listed in the statutes and rules. In 
addition, a “stock offering review committee” appointed by the CSRC 
makes an independent judgment as to whether the proposed offering can go 
forward. Such a screening system may help unsophisticated retail investors, 
who constitute the mainstream of Chinese investors, to encounter better 
investment targets, but it possesses several serious drawbacks: 
First, the entire system is biased against smaller non-state-owned 
companies. The fiscal conditions for a company to be allowed to issue 
shares publicly are high, and there is a demanding profit requirement for 
three consecutive years.2 Given the institutional favoritism toward state 
owned enterprises (the securities market was originally established with a 
clear goal to save financially distressed and capital thirsty state owned 
enterprise (SOEs)), it is much more difficult for smaller non-state-owned 
companies to have access to the market, especially start-ups and new 
technology companies. Not surprisingly, almost all of the Chinese internet 
companies, none of which is a SOE, have chosen to be listed outside China. 
Currently, hundreds of companies are waiting in the queue for the CSRC to 
review their submitted IPO application files. 
Second, the system lacks transparency. Inasmuch as companies being 
 
 
*Professor Cohn is Emeritus Professor of Law, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. 
Professor Miao is an Associate Professor of Law, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, 
China. Professor Miao thanks the Special Fund for Scientific Research in Central Universities of the P. 
R. China. 
1 The agency has an English version of its website. About CSRC, CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY 
COMMISSION, http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2018). 
2 Measures for the Administration of Initial Public Offering and Listing of Stocks Administrative 
(promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm., May 17, 2006, effective May 18, 2006, in accordance with 
the Decision of the China Sec. Reg. on Amending the Measures for the Administration of Initial Public 
Offering and Listing of Stocks, Dec.30, 2015), specifies that an issuer should have a continuous profit 
record for the latest three accounting years with the aggregate profits exceeding 30 million yuan; the 
accumulative cash flow deriving from business operations in the latest three accounting years should 
exceed 50 million yuan or the aggregate business revenues in the latest three accounting years should 
exceed 300 million Yuan; stock capital before the public offering should be no less than 30 million 
Yuan; the value  of  intangible  assets  must not exceed  20% of the net assets  at the end of the most 
recent  accounting  year; no  unrecovered  losses  at  the  end  of  the  most  recent accounting  year(art. 
26). An English version is available athttp://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=262012&lib=law(last 
visited Apr. 1, 2018).  
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reviewed have met all the explicit IPO requirements, there are no clear 
standards for the decisions made by the offering review committee. Vital 
decisions are left to the subjective judgments of the committee members. 
Rejection decisions cannot be legally challenged. The securities law 
provides no remedy to the rejected companies which also have no official 
operative guidance on how to enhance their chances if they intend to submit 
future applications.  
Third, the offering control system becomes even more rigid and 
paternalistic after IPOs are allowed. The CSRC imposes its own 
determination upon the offering price, often demanding a lower-than-
market figure based on average industry price/earnings ratios. 
Fourth, the CSRC approval process is both volatile and unpredictable. 
As the CSRC retains the unconstrained power to control the number of firms 
and shares to be permitted in the primary market, it is never certain how the 
power will be exerted. Whenever the market turns bearish there are 
discussions and predictions among securities market professionals and 
investors as to whether restrictive actions will be taken. Administrative 
suspensions of IPO offerings have taken place nine times since 1994, some 
of which extended more than one year, seriously affecting the capacities of 
firms planning to raise capital in the market. 
In short, the CSRC controlled IPO system has led to inequalities, 
inefficiency, and instabilities in the Chinese securities system. The 
possibility of reforming the system has been a consistent topic in the 
Chinese law academia. Unfortunately, the discussions produced loud 
thunders but small raindrops until 2013 when Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang 
took over the leadership of the country as General Secretary of the 
Communist Party/Chairman of the State and the Premier, respectively. Xi 
was educated at Beijing’s prestigious Tsinghua University, and Li has both 
a law degree and doctor’s degree in Economics from equally prestigious 
Peking University.3 Given the unprecedented higher education backgrounds 
of these top leaders, it was not surprising that shortly after their ascension 
to leadership the government announced proposals for a major economic 
reform. 
In November 2013, The Decision on Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms4 was passed by the Third Plenary 
 
 
3 Premier Li has consistently revealed his belief in a smaller state and letting the market do its job. 
See,e.g.,. Jamil Anderlini, China’s Premier Li Keqiang Targets Smaller Role for State, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Mar.17, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/77c70e1a-8ed0-11e2-be3a-00144feabdc0.html. 
4 The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms in Brief, CHINA 
DAILY (Nov. 16, 2013), http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-
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Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 
This is intended as the fundamental economic agenda of the party-state for 
the next five years. The Decision document included statements of 
economic system reform such as “letting the market be decisive in the 
resources allocation” and “incompetence in the market system, excessive 
state intervention and inadequacy in regulation should be curbed.”5 Most 
significantly, the administrative control of initial public offerings became a 
target of the reform. A policy goal quickly developed to eliminate CSRC 
control of market access and “push a registration system reform for stock 
offering,” as described in the Decision.6 
The resolution of the ruling party left open the technical details of the 
so-called registration system. The initial common perception of what a 
“registration system” would look like was a system in which a firm that has 
met the substantive registration requirements would be qualified to go 
forward with an IPO without further CSRC or other governmental review, 
similar to the U.S. registration system. However, this simplistic picture does 
not exactly reflect the practice in the U.S., given the application of state 
Blue Sky laws. Moreover, any legal transplant in such a crucial area could 
be impractical, given the markedly different cultural, experiential, and 
financial distinctions between China and the United States.  
The change from agency approval to a pure registration system was 
expected to be implemented as early as 2015. However, reform is on 
temporary hold as a result of China’s stock market crisis in July2015, which 
saw a substantial drop in share prices, suspensions of trading, and a freeze 
on new offerings.7 Attention will again turn to reform efforts when the 
government concludes that the Chinese markets have regained stability. On 
December 27, 2015, the Standing Committee of National People's Congress 
formally authorized the State Council to adjust the application of relevant 
provisions in the Securities Law as it carries out the reform concerning the 
stock issuance registration system.8 The authorization became valid on 
March 1, 2016 and was renewed on Feb. 24, 2018 for another two years 
 
 
11/16/content_30620736.htm. This is an authorized government portal site, published under the auspices 
of the State Council Information Office and the China International Publishing Group. 
5 Id. (translation provided by authors).  
6 Id. 
7 KyoungwhaKwi and Fox Hu, China Stock Sellers Frozen Out of 71% of Market, BLOOMBERG 
(July 8, 2015, 3:34 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-08/china-trade-halts-hit-2-
2-trillion-as-state-intervention-fails.  
8 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Authorizing the State 
Council to Adjust the Relevant Applicable Provisions of the Securities Law of the People's Republic of 
China in the Implementation of Stock Issuance Registration System Reform (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2015, effective Mar. 1, 2016),available at 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=261784&lib=law. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/6
  
 
 
 
 
2018]            REFORMING CHINA’S IPO LAWS                    333 
 
 
 
 
before the original two terms expired. Thus, the final overhaul of the 
securities law may be postponed for as much as two years within which the 
State Council has the flexibility to implement reform measures. This allows 
additional time for deliberate thought for how the abstract goal of an open 
registration system may be achieved within the Chinese market structure.9 
The primary element of reform, an open registration system, necessarily 
raises questions as to company eligibilities, stock exchange listings, and 
investor protections. Inasmuch as the expected registration system is 
analogous to that in the U.S., we will explore whether and to what extent 
reforms should be adopted based upon the U.S. experience. This article 
compares and contrasts Chinese and U.S. securities laws in several major 
respects and offers recommendations in light of China’s particular 
circumstances and goals. 
Part I of this article describes the historical development of China’s stock 
exchanges, including the authority of the CSRC and its exercise of powers. 
Part II discusses the potential market reforms being considered. Part III 
discusses concerns and potential policy issues raised by the proposed 
reforms and sets forth recommendations for measures to be implemented 
prior to or concurrent with the reform effort. 
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE SECURITIES 
EXCHANGES 
1. The Death and Rebirth of Securities Markets in P.R. China  
Before 1949, when the Communist Party had not yet taken over the 
country, there were flourishing securities markets in China, especially in 
Shanghai. But after the People’s Liberation Army marched into the cities, 
all forms of capital markets and related financial activities were eliminated 
as obvious evil symbols of capitalism. On June 10, 1949, police stormed 
into the Shanghai Securities Exchange and put thousands of people in the 
building into custody, ending the exchanges.10The national economy 
became one system in which every aspect was planned and directed by the 
 
 
9SeeXi Jinping’s Failed Promises Dim Hopes for Economic Change in 2nd Term,N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-economic-
reform.html(“Wu Jinghan, one of China’s most promising economists, said at a recent meeting in Beijing 
that ‘the direction of reform laid out in these documents is clear, and the measures are right, but the 
problem has been implementation.’”). 
10 Selected Issues of Culture and History in Shanghai [shanghai wenshiziliaoxuanji], (Working 
Committee of Culture and History Materials of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
Shanghai Committee, Working Paper No. 60, 1988).  
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central government.  
Following 1956, there was no entity with the name or essence of 
“company” (gongsi). The usual names of the institutions which had been 
enterprises were “factories” (chang), machine factory, clothes factory and 
so on. They were production units whose products would be allocated 
according to administrative orders. This was the so-called planned 
economy. The system was a failure and the Chinese economy, without 
market mechanism and business companies, suffered.   
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the inception of the Reform 
Era in 1978, the Chinese government began to understand the significance 
of introducing market mechanisms and financial instruments. In 1981, state 
treasury bonds began to be issued, followed by bonds issued by state-owned 
enterprises. Shenzhen Bao’an Company pioneered in issuing shares to the 
general public in 1983,11although most firms continued to raise funds 
principally from their employees as they were not permitted to engage in 
financial market transactions.  
As a result of the unfolding business development movements supported 
by the World Bank and reformists within the regime, stock exchanges for 
corporate shares developed. A number oflocal exchange markets were 
founded after 1985. Ironically, a catalyst for the direct push for economic 
reform and financial innovation was the Tiananmen Square episode in June 
1989. As a result of the tragedy, international financial sanctions were 
imposed on China. Pro-reformists within the Party, such as former Premier 
(1998-2003) Zhu Rongji, then the governor of Shanghai, pushed for the 
formation of securities exchanges in pursuit of dual goals: first, to make 
more use of domestic funding to support economic development, and 
second to send a signal to the world that in spite of crackdowns, China 
would continue to pursue economic reform.12 
China’s two principal exchanges, the Shanghai and Shenzhen securities 
exchanges, began operation in December 1990. Ironically, the reason why 
the exchanges were named “securities exchanges” instead of “stock 
exchanges,” as the case in New York, is that old communist cadres would 
be sensitive to the evil “stock” (gupiao) but they were not so familiar with 
the conception of “securities” (zhengquan).  
 
 
 
11 SHENZHEN ECONOMIC SPECIAL ZONE [SHENZHENJINGJITEQUNIANPU] 48 (Tao Yitao, eds., 
2015).  
12 In the opening ceremony of Shanghai Securities Exchange on December 19, 1990, Governor 
Zhu Rongji stated “The fact that we establish Shanghai Securities Exchange shows China's 
determination for reform and opening up will not change”. BREAKTHROUGH: THE DEVELOPING PATH 
OF THE CAPITAL MARKET IN CHINA 110 (Liu Hongru, eds., China Finance Publisher, 2008) , [tupo: 
zhongguozibenshichangfazhanzhilu]. Liu was the first chair of the CSRC. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/6
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2. Government Control Over the Exchanges: From Local to Central  
At first, the Shanghai and Shenzhen securities exchanges were under the 
control of local governments. The Shanghai and Shenzhen municipal 
governments had the primary authority to run the exchanges. It was 
stipulated in the 1993 Interim Measures of the Administrationof Securities 
Exchange that “the exchanges are subject to the administration of the 
municipalities administration in whose jurisdiction they are established.” 
Economic decentralization and regional competition, the so-called 
tournament model, depended upon the goals of incentivized local officials. 
This was regarded by many as the reason why the communist government 
could achieve tremendous economic success in such a large and diverse 
country.13 
Another reason for the decentralization was that the central government 
was not sure such bourgeoisie concepts as securities exchanges and stock 
trading would be what they actually wanted. They treated the establishment 
of exchanges as an experiment. In January 1992 Deng Xiaoping, the de facto 
top leader of China in 1980s and early 1990s, stated during his famous 
Southern Tour (which decisively pushed China toward a road to market 
economy): “Securities, stock market, are these things good or not, 
hazardous or not, are they unique to the capitalism and unfit for socialism? 
It is OK to observe, but we should try with determination . . . If it turns out 
to be right, open up. If wrong, correct it, shut down.”14By distancing the 
central government from the capitalism trial, Beijing could be shielded from 
any negative effects if the newly established markets turned out to be 
failures.  
After nearly a decade of development, the Chinese government 
acknowledged the necessity of capital market platforms and centralized the 
control of exchanges in 1997 and 1998.15  The Securities Law enacted in 
December 1998 (and effective in July 1999),formally legalized the 
dominant role of the securities regulator, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC).16Under the 1998 statute the CSRC was granted the 
authority to “carry out supervision and administration of the securities 
 
 
13 See Chenggang Xu and Juzhong Zhuang, Why China Grew: the Role of Decentralization,in 
EMERGING FROM COMMUNISM: LESSONS FROM RUSSIA, CHINA, AND EASTERN EUROPE (Peter Boone, 
et al. eds. ,Cambridge: MIT Press 1998). 
14 SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING VOL. 3, 373 (1993). 
15 See STEPHEN GREEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S STOCK MARKET, 1984-2002: EQUITY 
POLITICS AND MARKET INSTITUTIONS151-54 (David S. Goodman ed., RoutledgeCurzon2004).  
16 The formation of Company law and securities law in China are described in JIANFU CHEN, 
CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 461-91(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers2008). 
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market” and to be responsible for investigating and punishing any violations 
of the securities laws. These roles remain the same under the amended 
Securities Act of 2005.17 
3. Administrative Powers over IPOs 
The Chinese government has retained a tight control of initial public 
offerings (IPOs), which controls cover almost every major aspect of the 
stock offering. First, the CSRC exercises the power of granting permission 
for initial and secondary public offering of securities.18No IPO or 
subsequent issuance can be made without CSRC approval. 
Secondly, the government has always tried to shape, if not directly 
dictate, the issuing price for the securities offering, most often in a 
conservative manner. Due to these two factors, the securities markets have 
been under-supplied and share prices have not necessarily reflected 
company value and/or market demand. Both of these controls appear to be 
motivated by the government’s determination to limit the risk of economic 
loss, and thus populist unease, among the investing public. 
Third, there is an automatic link between an IPO and getting 
listed.19Even after the exchanges formally obtained the right to list and delist 
a security in the revision of the Securities Law in 2005, they possess no real 
power to deny a company from becoming listed. The CSRC’s decision as 
to where a company will be listed is overriding. A firm that has obtained 
IPO permission will be listed on one of the two exchanges as determined by 
the CSRC. Neither the issuer nor the exchanges have a right to refuse. Nor 
are the exchanges able to accept a new company without a CSRC-approved 
IPO. 
4. How Are the Candidates for IPOs Selected? 
A. Initial Policy: Quotas Allocated to Provinces 
In the earliest stage, the first decade after the rebirth of securities 
exchanges in China, the opportunities for public offering were viewed 
solely as privileges of state owned enterprises (SOEs). Each year, after the 
 
 
17 See Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), arts. 178, 179 (China).  
18 Id.at art. 23. 
19 All secondary trading in shares of companies that engaged in a registered IPO must be done on 
a formal stock exchange. Id. atart. 39. Historically the CSRC has determined which exchange new 
companies will trade on, and since 2001 it has generally assigned larger SOEs and private companies to 
the Shanghai Exchange, and smaller companies to Shenzhen.  
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total amount of funds to be raised by various SOEs had been determined by 
the central government as a part of the macro-economic policy, the 
privileges were directly allocated to provincial governments and ministries, 
which could decide which companies under their jurisdictions would be the 
lucky ones to enter the capital market. 20 
It is not surprising that many of the selected SOEs were not in good 
financial shape. It was well understood and widely acknowledged that the 
primary goal of building the capital market in China was to save troubled 
and thirsty SOEs which could gain access to investor funds and in turn help 
support local economies through local employment and expenditures. The 
primacy of the financing needs for SOEs is a fact that the state has not 
attempted to hide. For example, in November 2015, the Securities Time, run 
by the People's Daily, commented that “[o]ver the past 20 years, the capital 
market...provided a lot of capital for the development of state-owned 
enterprises and state-owned banks.”21 
The CSRC’s interest clearly diverged from those of the provincial 
governments since under-qualified listed companies caused regulatory 
concerns. The CSRC wanted to ensure better firms were recommended. 
Two prominent commentators found that the CSRC adjusted quotas based 
on the performance of listed companies previously endorsed by provinces 
and ministries.22 
B. The CSRC Takes Control 
i) Securities Companies as Sponsors 
In January 2001, the Chinese government announced that the three-year 
campaign of saving SOEs from financial troubles had accomplished its 
goal.23In the same year, the CSRC initiated a new program to replace 
 
 
20 Fang Liufang, China's Corporatization Experiment,5 DUKE J.COMP. & INT’L L. 149, 169 (1995); 
see also Alex K. L. Lau, A Study of Listing Applications in the People's Republic of China,28 COMPANY 
LAWYER 90, 93(2007).  
21 Cheng Dan, Steady Progress and Push Forward the Reform and Development of Capital Market, 
SECURITIES TIMES (Dec.12, 2015),http://epaper.stcn.com/paper/zqsb/html/2015-
11/12/content_751698.htm.Securities Time is a professional securities newspaper run by People's Daily 
(the official paper of the China Communist Party)and one of the designated newspapers for disclosure 
documents of listed companies and financial institutions. 
22 Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons 
from China, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 184 (2005). 
23 “The chair of National Economy and Trade Commission announced that the three-year campaign 
of saving SOEs from financial troubles had accomplished its goal.” Sheng Huaren Announced That the 
Three-Year Goal of the State-Owned Enterprise Reforms Will Be Realized, CHINA.COM, 
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2001/Jan/16356.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).  
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provincial administrations with securities companies (underwriters) as the 
primary referees and endorsers of offering applicants. In March 2001, the 
Securities Association of China formally notified securities companies to 
recommend offering applicants. This was named “channel institution.” 
Based on their underwriting record in 2000, securities companies were 
given between two to nine so-called channels.24For each channel the 
underwriter was authorized to recommend one issuer. Only after the issuer 
completed the issuance process could the securities company reuse the 
channel for a new client.  
The channel system lasted only two years and was replaced in 
2003.25Under the new system, securities companies were explicitly 
entrusted as “sponsors” with the primary task of ensuring the quality of their 
sponsored issuers. This practice was borrowed from Hong Kong, whose 
sponsorship regime was adopted from the nominated advisors (Nomads) 
employed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock 
Exchange.26 
For each public offering the issuer must hire a sponsor that is a securities 
company and two sponsor representatives who are natural persons. The 
sponsor’s major role is tutoring and monitoring the issuer for the whole 
offering process and for at least one year after the public offering. 
27Normally the same securities company would provide both underwriter 
and sponsor services. Each sponsor representative is entitled to work for 
only one issuer until his client has been submitted to the Offering Review 
Committee. The sponsor and sponsor representatives are required to do 
extensive due diligence work and keep original records. If fraud is detected 
with the public offering and the sponsor is at fault, the CSRC would punish 
the sponsor and representatives, including rescinding the qualification of 
sponsorship and imposition of fines.28 
 
 
 
 
24 Based on the allocations, 83 securities companies possessed 318 channels. Lin Jian, Securities 
Association of China Noted That “83 Securities Companies Possessing 318 Channels” Ended, 
SHANGHAI SECURITIES NEWS, Jan. 4, 2005.  
25 The Interim Administrative Measures for the Stock Issuance and Listing Sponsorship System, 
(promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm., Dec. 28, effective Feb. 1, 2004) (China). An informal 
English version is available at http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=50979&lib=law.  
26 Hui Huang, The Regulation of Securities Offerings in China: Reconsidering the Merit Review 
Element in Light of the Global Financial Crisis, 41 HONG KONG L.J. 261, 264 (2011). 
27 Administrative Measures for the Sponsorship Business of the Issuance and Listing of Securities 
(promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm., Oct. 17, 2008, effective Dec. 1, 2008, rev’d May 2009) 
(China). An informal English version is available at 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=109468&lib=law.  
28 Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 17, §192.  
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ii) The Offering Review Committee 
In 1999, a formal Offering Review Committee was founded by the 
CSRC to vet and decide which companies could undertake an IPO. The 
establishment of this new organ was required by the Securities Law which 
came into effect in July 1999.29 
The Offering Review Committee consists of commissioners from 
multiple ministry-level administrative organs and external experts including 
academics, lawyers, and accountants, each appointed for three-year terms. 
Initially the composition of the committee was kept secret, and after 2005, 
its membership was openly disclosed. Ironically, in 2005, during the period 
of confidentiality, a CRSC official was sentenced to thirteen years of prison 
for selling the secret names to potential issuers.30 
When the CSRC determines that a candidate firm is to be reviewed, it 
selects the particular commissioners to serve in a review meeting. The 
commissioners have complete discretion to decide whether an applicant 
company will engage in an IPO and become an exchange-listed company. 
The specific vote from each commissioner is not disclosed, but it is recorded 
and kept by the CSRC. 
In theory, the review committee’s major criterion is the sustainability of 
profitability of the applicant company, which at a minimum under the 
Securities Act is a record of three consecutive profitable years. But in fact, 
the committee has wide, discretionary authority and there is no clear 
restraint on the approval process. The committee’s decision is also not 
legally challengeable. Indeed, from one perspective it appears that the 
review committee may just be a handmaiden utilized by the CSRC. Given 
the committee’s heavy workload and composition by members indebted to 
the CSRC for their appointment, it is appropriate to wonder whether the 
review committee is simply a subterfuge for decisions otherwise made or at 
least controlled by the CSRC.  
iii) IPO Suspensions 
Moreover, the CSRC has an even greater power, namely to determine 
whether there will be IPO offerings at all. On nine occasions the CSRC, 
acting no doubt in conformance with orders from central government 
 
 
29 Id. 
30 Securities Regulatory Official Punished for Taking Bribes, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Dec. 10, 
2015), http://en.people.cn/200512/10/eng20051210_227120.html. PEOPLE.CN is run by PEOPLE'S 
DAILY.  
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authorities, has suspended all IPOs applications.31A suspension means no 
meeting for the review of IPO applications is convened by the CSRC, even 
though quite a number of companies have submitted their applications. The 
suspension in 2013 lasted an entire year, setting a de facto ban on new issues 
in an effort to soothe investor concerns and to restore market confidence is 
a custom carried out by the CSRC. Exactly what standards the CSRC uses 
for such actions are not clear, but such suspensions have been common over 
the years as shown by the following table: 
Suspensions of IPOs 
Measured by the Shanghai Composite Index 
NO. FROM TO TRADING DAYS 
1 1994/7/21 1994/12/7 98 
2 1995/1/19 1995/6/9 96 
3 1995/7/5 1996/1/3 128 
4 2001/7/31 2001/11/2 64 
5 2004/8/26 2005/1/21 101 
6 2005/5/25 2006/6/2 249 
7 2008/9/16 2009/7/10 198 
8 2012/11/1
6 
2014/1/7 274 
9 
2015/7/4 
2015/11/2
3 
95 
Source: Compiled According to Public Data.32 
iv) IPO Price Controls 
Price control is also a major regulatory issue. The CSRC is extremely 
sensitive to the IPO price. The CSRC has been haunted by the concept of 
the “three highs”: (i) high issuing price, (ii) high price/earnings ratio, and 
(iii) high percentage of over-raised funds. When higher-than-needed funds 
do not have a specific allocated usage, it is tempting for a company to divert 
the funds to non-productive uses, to affiliated companies, or to other 
improper measures. 
 
 
31 See Suspensions of IPOs Table infra note 32. 
32 Counting 9 IPO Suspensions in History: How Will the Stock Market Go After All the Restarts?, 
IFENG.COM (Nov. 6, 2015),  http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20151106/14059186_0.shtml.  
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Price control is motivated in part by the fact that the majority of 
securities investors in China are retail investors, many of whom have little 
knowledge of finance. Chinese investors do not possess many options and 
Chinese listed companies seldom distribute dividends, thus making the 
securities market very speculative based on share price changes. The 
CSRC’s tight control on the issuance opportunities constrains the supply of 
new stocks. The IPO thus constitutes a major opportunity for speculation. 
There has always been an “irrational fever,” as the CSRC put it, when a new 
security is offered for sale.33In our opinions, the agency does not want the 
IPO price to be too high, for post-offering speculation may trap initial 
buyers who bought at a too high price during the initial days of the IPO. 
Investor anger is inevitably directed at the CSRC. Hence the CSRC has 
persistently taken measures to cap the IPO price. 
The CSRC has attempted to augment its review of the IPO offering price 
with a price bid solicitation mechanism (xunjia) to help determine the 
proper valuation of an IPO offering. Institutional investors and wealthy 
natural persons are invited to bid for the IPO price in a two-phase procedure, 
the first one to decide a range, and the second to decide a specific price 
within that range. The 2006 Administration Measures of Securities Issuance 
and Underwriting34made this step an indispensable component for initial 
public offerings. After May 2012, the result of price bidding became a 
consultative one for the issuer. This flexibility actually allows the CSRC to 
press the company to employ a low price when the agency believes that a 
lower price would be beneficial in a weak primary market, as was the case 
in the IPO of China Molybdenum in September 2012.35 
II. PROSPECTS FOR A REGISTRATION SYSTEM REFORM 
Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang formally took over the leadership of P.R. 
China in March of 2013 when they became, respectively, the Chair and 
Premier of the country.36From the start it appeared that a somewhat new 
 
 
33 For example, the CSRC issued a notice urging securities companies to diligently prevent and 
curb speculation over new stocks in March 2012, saying “three highs” and new stock fever is an 
irrational phenomenon. Liu Wei, Shenzhen Stock Exchange Again Warned of “Frivolous New Risk, 
Urges Brokers to do Their Duty, SHANGHAI SECURITIES NEWS (May 9, 2012), 
http://westdollar.com/sbdm/finance/news/1345,20120509204605986_1.html.  
34 Administration Measures of Securities Issuance and Underwriting (promulgated by the China 
Sec. Reg. Commission, effective Sept. 17, 2006), art.2 (China). 
35 See Miao Yinzhi, A Revisit of IPO Price Bid Solicitation Reform as Reflected by the China 
Molybdenum Case, JURISPRUDENCE (FAXUE), 2013.  
36 Chris Buckley, China’s New President Nods to Public Concerns, but Defends Power at Top, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/world/asia/chinas-new-leader-xi-
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ideology was emerging in the relation of the government and economy. 
Market oriented reform seemed to be accelerating after nearly a decade of 
stagnation during the Hu Administration.  
China’s capital market is poised to undergo an overhaul with a 
commitment to eliminate the CSRC’s veto power over proposed IPOs. The 
reasons are easy to find:37 (i) the current system denies too many firms the 
access to capital, especially young, private companies; (ii) bureaucrats lack 
expert knowledge or adequate information to distinguish good companies 
from bad ones; and (iii) non-transparency in the approval process provides 
a fertile ground for corruption. As evidence of the latter, in November 2015, 
Yao Gang, vice chair of the CSRC, was arrested in an anti-corruption 
crackdown on the financial sector. The man was nicknamed “king of IPOs” 
for the area he had been in charge of for thirteen years.38 
1. The Tentative Framework in the Draft of the New Securities Law 
In a draft of the new Securities Law submitted to the Standing 
Committee of National People's Congress,39 the prospective new 
registration system has the following major features: 
(1) All IPO submissions will go directly to one of the two principal 
securities exchanges (Article 21); 
(2) The stock exchange to which the IPO issuer has made application 
will review the draft prospectus to determine their 
“completeness, consistency and intelligibility” (Article 22); 
(3) The requirement for a profit record for three consecutive years 
will be eliminated (Art.20); 
 
 
jinping-takes-full-power.html. 
37 Similar attacks have been imposed on the blue-sky laws in the U.S. See, e.g., Rutheford B. 
Campbell Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L.553 (1985); Charles 
H. B. Braisted, State Registration of Securities: An Anachronism No Longer Viable, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 
401 (2000); C. T. Farson, At What Cost Paternalism? A Call to State Legislatures to Reconsider the 
Propriety of Merit Review of Securities Offerings,22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 963, 986 (1990); Marianne M. 
Jennings, The Efficacy of Merit Review of Common Stock Offerings: Do Regulators Know More than 
the Market?,7 BYU J. PUB. L. 211, 218-222 (1993). 
38 Liyan Chen, China's 'King of IPOs' Is Arrested on Corruption Probe, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2015, 
2:43 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015/11/13/chinas-king-of-ipos-is-arrested-on-
corruption-probe. 
39 The People’s Republic of China Securities Law (Revised Draft), FINANCIAL SERVICE LAW (May 
2, 2015),www.financialservicelaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=4777. Though there has never been an 
official version of the bill, which is typical of the non-transparency in the Chinese legislation, this 
informal copy is consistent with other copies obtained from various sources; its authenticity is confirmed 
by a number of leading scholars and officials of the CSRC. 
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(4) The CSRC will not review disclosures based on consistency, 
completeness or intelligibility;  
(5) If the exchange intends to grant a registration for offering, the 
decision along with the examination opinions are to be sent to the 
CSRC, which has 10 days in which to object to the registration, 
otherwise the exchange’s decision will become effective (Art.23);  
(6) The CSRC may conduct site inspections of the applicants or 
entrust a securities intermediary institution to examine applicants if 
it deems such to be necessary (Art.24); 
(7) A refusal to or interference with the above inspection or 
examination, or misrepresentation in the registration documents will 
lead to a cessation of registration (Art.26). 
The principal reform from the current norm is that the CSRC will no 
longer be able to refuse or sit on the application of a company desiring an 
IPO. All companies that satisfy the IPO standards, as determined by the 
exchange to which they have applied, will be able to go forward with an 
IPO. However, there is a major caveat. The proposal allows the CSRC tento 
object to an exchange’s decision (Article 23). At present, there are no 
standards developed on which to base such an objection. Although the 
proposal clearly intended to remove substantial authority from the CSRC, it 
did not eliminate entirely the CSRC’s decision-making capacity. The 
absence of standards relative to the CSRC’s power leaves the door open to 
potential favoritism, selectivity, and corruption that has been witnessed in 
the past. Moreover, until the process begins, one cannot be sure that the 
CSRC will not have strong influence over decisions made by the exchanges. 
If an open registration process is the goal, allowing a veto power to the 
CSRC without clear enumerated standards is a mistake. 
Perhaps the positioning of one more safety valves made the legislators 
feel more relieved in considering the potentially tumultuous market. The 
dual check structure utilizing both the CSRC and stock exchanges was 
likely inspired by the dual filing regime in Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, the 
system is disclosure-based, with the applicant sending duplicate materials 
to the exchange and the regulator respectively.40But the Chinese and Hong 
Kong histories differ, and what will actually transpire when and if the 
regulations are adopted is uncertain.  
 
 
40 BERRY HSU, ET AL., FINANCIAL MARKETS IN HONG KONG: LAW AND PRACTICE 175-76 (Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
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Two facts create some concern: first, the exchanges in China Mainland 
are by no means autonomous; they are likely to be heavily influenced by the 
CSRC. Second, the exchanges would be very cautious to carry out the power 
to open wide their entrance gates. Thus, whether the open registration 
system will in fact lead to a major rise in IPOs is uncertain. By passing 
offering approval authority onto the exchanges, subject to CSRC review, it 
may be feared that the exchanges, under pressure or guidance from the ever-
cautious CSRC, may adopt or impose standards that significantly limit the 
number or types of first-time issuers. If this scenario develops, the open 
registration system would be an unfortunate change in form, but not 
substance. 
2. Reform Suspended: The 2015 Market Crash  
The push for market reform, initiated in 2013, was significantly stalled 
by the market crash of 2015.In the summer of 2015 the Shanghai Composite 
index fell from 5178 to around 3000,41marking a catastrophic event in the 
history of China’s securities market. Many, including government 
regulators, are still in a state of shock from the plummeting of over 30% in 
the Shanghai Index (and over 40% in Growth Enterprise Market) in the three 
weeks from June 15 to July 8. On July 8, 2015, half of the listed exchange 
stocks voluntary announced temporary suspensions in trading.42 Though 
less catastrophic than the 2008 market crisis in the U.S., China’s market 
crash was more significant in its impact upon both regulatory attitudes and 
Chinese speculative fever.  
One factor that triggered the rapid market decline was margin trading, a 
relatively new phenomenon in China. Margin trading was first allowed by 
the CSRC in 2006.43 However, broker firms were not allowed to carry out 
margin trading until March 2010 due to the 2008 financial crisis. Driven by 
lucrative opportunities offered by the bull market of the first half of 2015, 
many investors employed internet-based software (e.g., Hundsun 
Management System (HOMS)), with implicit permission of securities 
companies, to build multiple layers of “virtual” securities trading accounts 
 
 
41 Mark Thompson and Charles Riley, World Markets Plunge as China Stocks Crash, CNN MONEY 
(Aug. 24, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/23/investing/world-stock-markets/index.html. 
42 Sophia Yan, Over Half of China's Stocks Have Stopped Trading, CNN (July 8, 2015, 5:07 AM) 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/08/investing/china-stocks-suspended (“At least 1,430 of the 2,800 
companies traded in China have elected to pull their shares as markets continue their crazy roller-coaster 
ride”). 
43 Notice of China Securities Regulatory Commission on Promulgating the Measures for the 
Administration of Pilot Securities Lending and Borrowing Business of Securities Companies 
(promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm., June 20, 2006, effective Aug. 1, 2006) (China), available 
athttp://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=77564&lib=law. 
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within one formal account. Underground margin trading financed by 
sources other than securities companies boomed, and a leverage of 1:5 to 
1:10 was common. 
When the CSRC announced a curb on underground margin financing on 
June 12, 2015,44 no one anticipated the tremendously adverse market 
consequences. On June 26, a CSRC spokesperson stated that the then 
ongoing market decline was simply a natural adjustment.45 However, the 
decline began to resemble a furious bear. The forced unwinding of high ratio 
financing caused stock prices to drop and put even those with lower margin 
ratios in danger, resulting in many investors being forced to rush out of the 
market for fear of further declines.  
The days abounded with unusual responses from the government. The 
CSRC tried various measures to restore the market, including a suspension 
of IPOs, a suspension of the statutory ban on short swing trading by 
insiders46 who want to purchase stocks within six months of an earlier sale, 
and a six-monthban on the selling of any shares by insiders.  
Eventually the market stabilized. But the pace and content of securities 
law reform was clearly influenced. The 2015 crisis caused a suspension in 
regulation reform. It was well understood that the state needs a bull market 
to support proposed changes to a system that will substantially increase the 
supply of stock offerings. It is only now, two years after the market crash, 
that confidence has revived in the market to the extent that significant 
reforms can be considered and adopted. However, the crash has affected the 
psyche and it remains to be seen whether a more open-ended market will in 
fact be achieved.47 
III. REFORM CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
There is, as might be expected, considerable concern that movement to 
a pure registration system will open the floodgates to innumerable public 
 
 
 44 China Market Regulator Seeks to Cap Margin Trading, Short Selling, REUTERS (June 12, 2015), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/china-margin-financing/update-1-china-market-regulator-seeks-to-
cap-margin-trading-short-selling-idUSL3N0YY3H620150612. 
45 Press Conference June 26, 2015, CSRC (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhxwfb/xwfbh/201506/t20150626_279827.html. 
46 The insiders include directors, supervisors, executives and shareholders with 5% or more of 
stocks in the listed companies. See Securities Law of the Peoples Republic of China, supra note 17, art. 
47. 
47 See Lingling Wei, Beijing Faces Setback With Its State Sector, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2017), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2017/08/18/beijing-faces-setback-with-its-state-sector-wsj.html) 
(“While the leadership has stated its desire to channel more private capital in sectors long monopolized 
by inefficient state firms, like telecommunications, it has also set out to strengthen Communist Party 
control over the companies and prevent any losses of state assets.”).  
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offerings by poorly managed, under-financed and possibly corrupt 
companies. Those concerns must be taken seriously, as China has 
experienced poor and sometimes corrupt public offerings even with the 
CSRC’s supervisory authority. The concerns are exacerbated by the lack of 
a sophisticated investing public and a rather inexperienced and inadequate 
securities industry infrastructure relative to investor protection matters. It is 
therefore recommended that the reform movement to a registration system 
not be implemented unless and until certain additional reform measures are 
taken in advance or concurrently with adoption of the new law.  
1. Merit Review of Proposed Offerings 
The single most important question is whether the proposed registration 
system should involve some conditional elements analogous to merit review 
standards.  It appears from initial indications that the current requirement 
for three years of profits will be eliminated. That is appropriate, as there are 
many companies, especially in the high-tech field, that offer great promise 
for investors but have not yet recorded profits. There is no such profit 
requirement in the United States or in most developed countries. 
Elimination of the requirement in China would be appropriate. However, 
once the doors open to companies that have not recorded a stream of profits, 
it may be expected that numerous IPO applicants will come forth. A mature 
market should not worry about too many new issuers, but in China this is a 
real concern. It is typical for Chinese investors to believe that investing in 
the new issues, whose offering prices may have been restricted by the 
regulator, may be preferable to holding onto older stocks. It may be 
expected that many Chinese investors will discard older holdings in pursuit 
of speculative chances in new ones. Since this foreseeable tendency will 
pull down the entire market, other investors will sell their shares as a 
preemptive measure. This cycle can readily cause an acute bearish market. 
The distorted speculative opportunities are traced to the fact that the 
supply of new shares has historically been constrained by administrative 
control. There is an imminent concern that the market will become more 
volatile than ever when the door to listing suddenly becomes fully opened 
and a flood of issuers appears. The concern is fueled by both the potential 
numbers of new issuers and the potential lack of effective quality-control 
measures.  
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission does not engage in merit 
review. If a company meets all of the disclosure requirements it can go 
forward despite loss records and poor future prospects. But there is a safety 
net in the U.S. in the form of state Blue Sky laws. Every public offering 
must be registered both federally with the SEC and in every state where the 
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securities are being offered.48 Each state has the power to apply its own 
merit review standards to the offering. If a particular state securities 
commission believes that an offering creates too high of an investment risk 
for its citizens, or perhaps has unfair elements such as a disproportionate 
distribution of securities to insiders, the state can reject the offering within 
that state.49 This does not happen often, mainly because companies capable 
of going through the expense and rigors of a federal registration usually are 
sufficiently viable to withstand state merit reviews. However, the possibility 
of a state veto exists, and state merit review standards could be responsible 
for limiting the number of offerings that create high risk to investors.  
Empirical studies in the United States have noted the positive effects of 
merit review.50 If merit review has its advantages in a market as well 
developed as the United States, it would appear to be a given that merit 
review would be important in an immature market. Under the present 
circumstances in China, in which the competence and independence of 
securities professionals may not warrant adequate confidence for investor 
protection, merit standards may be appropriate.  
Taking these concerns into consideration, we recommend that the 
exchanges should impose a substantive, quality-based control over 
proposed IPO applicants in order to foster investor protection and market 
stability. Merit review standards, analogous to those adopted by many states 
in the United States, could effectively serve as quality-control measures if 
conscientiously and regularly applied. Professor Roberta Karmel has noted 
that U.S. state merit regulators actually worked to “acts as a negotiator in 
getting a better deal for investors,” they “directly intervene to require 
changes in the internal structure of a securities issuer, the relations among 
insiders and outsiders, and the terms of the offering.”51 
One significant factor in China is that, unlike mature Western markets, 
Chinese securities trading is mainly composed of and driven by 
unsophisticated retail investors. According to theChina Securities 
Depository and Clearing Statistic Yearbook (CSDC), by the end of 2014, 
 
 
48 UNIF. SECURITIES ACT, § 301, ¶ 5531(NAT’L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2005) (state registration required for offers or sales of a security “in this state.”) 
49 When the author, Stuart Cohn, was in the practice of law in Chicago, Illinois, the first public 
offering he worked on was a hotel company that had suffered several years of substantial losses. Because 
of the economic risks of the offering, the offering was rejected by all but nine states.  
50 See Jennings, supra note 36, at 240; E. Walker and B. R. Hadaway, Merit Standards Revisited: 
An Empirical Analysis of the Efficacy of Texas Merit Standards,7J. CORP. L. Law 651 1982), (evaluating 
the efficacy of the merit standards in Texas by using financial data to compare companies who received 
permissions to issue securities with companies that withdrew their requests to issue securities). 
51 Roberta S. Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden on Commerce?, 
53 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 116 (1987). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
348 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 17:327 
 
 
 
72.75% of the accounts established by natural persons or institutions held 
floated shares with market value below 100 thousand RMB (less than 
$15,000).52 In 2011, a CSRC study revealed that professional institutional 
investors only held 15.6% of the floated capitalization, while natural 
persons held 26.5%, and the other 57.9% shares being retained by 
shareholders who normally would not trade.53The data released by the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange showed that in 2012 natural person investors 
held 42.8% of floated capitalization, while professional institutional 
investors, including investment funds, pension funds, insurance companies, 
broker-dealers, and qualified institutions, held only 18%.54A survey 
conducted by the Securities Association of China and the China Securities 
Investor Protection Fund Company revealed that 70% of natural person 
investors are low-or middle-income, of which 35.2% earn an annual income 
below 24,000 RMB (less than $4,000).55 Nearly one-half of such investors 
received no higher education.56 
In addition, retail investors engage in active trading. The Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange reported that natural persons account for 85.6% of the trading 
volume measured by Yuan, while institutional investors account for only 
9.8%.57 A Chinese economist drew a similar conclusion based on the data 
of the 2012-2014 Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistic Yearbooks.58 The 
CSRC has acknowledged that “currently individual investors dominate the 
trading,” and that“professional institutional investors cannot work as 
stabilizers of the market, but rather passively accept the market quotation.”59 
Retail investors in a highly speculative market are at great risk. Many of 
them have neither the capacity nor the time to digest financial-related 
information in order to have an informed trading strategy. A pure 
 
 
52 CHINA SECURITIES DEPOSITORY & CLEARING CORPORATION, CHINA SECURITIES DEPOSITORY 
AND CLEARING STATISTIC YEARBOOK (2014), 
http://www.chinaclear.cn/zdjs/editor_file/20150603151710498.pdf. 
53 SFC: Natural Person Holding a Share Market Share Accounted for 26.5%, SECURITIES TIMES 
(June 21, 2012), http://kuaixun.stcn.com/content/2012-06/21/content_6016241.htm. 
54 SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE, SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE MARKET PERFORMANCE REPORT 
OF 2012, at 22 (2013), http://www.szse.cn/main/files/2013/02/28/148177440107.pdf [hereinafter 
“SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE”].  
55 SECURITIES ASSOCIATION OF CHINA & THE CHINA SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION FUND 
COMPANY, AN ANALYTICAL REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF INVESTORS IN CHINA'S SECURITIES MARKETS 
4 (July 2007), 
http://www.sipf.com.cn/images/dczx/dccg/2009/10/24/FDB3AFFCDA07A69E70596513588ECBB1.p
df. 
56 Id. at 5.  
57 SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 54, at 22. 
58 Deng Haiqing, Data to Speak: Retail is Indeed the Protagonist of A Shares!, CAIXIN (July 15, 
2015), http://opinion.caixin.com/2015-07-15/100829029.html.  
59 June 13, 2014 Press Conference, CSRC (June 13, 2014), 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhxwfb/xwfbh/201406/t20140613_256025.html. 
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disclosure-based system may not be able to protect investors or necessarily 
result in a rational market. This concern is illustrated by the manner in which 
Hong Kong exchange investors ignored the risks revealed in disclosures of 
certain structured securities in the 2008 financial crisis. After suffering 
substantial losses, many investors took to the streets, turning bad 
investments into social unrest.60 Some Chinese scholars refer to the Hong 
Kong experience as an example of the potential danger of relying too much 
on a pure disclosure system.61 The CSRC has good reason to be worried 
about investor protests, as it is not unusual for investors who have suffered 
losses to go to the CSRC headquarters begging for mercies or demonstrating 
anger. Given these circumstances, it is not improper to inquire whether this 
is the right time to create a pure disclosure-based system in a transitional 
market.62 
We are of the opinion that merit review standards are appropriate to 
determine which issuers are eligible for an IPO.  The Chinese market is still 
young, retail investors are relatively inexperienced, enforcement procedures 
and powers are under-utilized, and too few investors have access to 
qualified securities analysts.  
Although we favor merit review, we do not favor placing that power in 
the CSRC. There is too great a chance for favoritism, arbitrary exercise of 
authority, and potential corruption. The CSRC history with regard to non-
SOE companies seeking IPOs is not been a good one. Although it is possible 
to create a new agency for the sole purpose of establishing and determining 
merit standards, we believe that the analytical expertise currently existing 
within the two major stock exchanges is sufficient to avoid creating yet 
another tier of authority. We therefore recommend that the stock exchange 
for which the IPO applicant seeks listing be given the authority and duty to 
veto the IPO application if the issuer fails to meet the exchange’s adopted 
merit standards.  
We recommend that the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges mutually 
agree to a single set of merit requirements. At a minimum we believe that 
the following elements should be considered in creating the standards: 
 
 
 
60 See Andrew Godwin, The Lehman Minibonds Crisis in Hong Kong: Lessons for Plain Language 
Risk Disclosure, 32 UNSW L.J. 547, 561 (2009). 
61 See Robin Hui Huang, Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 757, 
774 (2013). 
62 See S.M. Solaiman, Adoption of the Disclosure-Based Regulation for Investor Protection in the 
Primary Share Market in Bangladesh: Putting the Cart Before the Horse?, 1 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. 
REV.115, 117 (2005). 
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1. If the offering succeeds, will the company have sufficient capital 
to achieve its economic goals? 
2. Has the issuer or any of the directors or officers been guilty of or 
liable for securities or other financial misdeeds? 
3. Is the offering price reasonable in light of the company’s history 
and financial circumstances? 
4. As a result of the proposed offering, will the founders and other 
insiders have a disproportionate amount of securities and control 
relative to their financial and managerial contributions? 
5. Does the issuer have in place corporate governance standards that 
mandate objective decision-making by directors and officers and 
fair decision-making responsibilities for shareholders? 
6. If the proposed offering is successful, will there be a sufficient 
public float to assure a viable secondary market? 
7. Are the entire proceeds from the proposed IPO to be used to 
further the business operations of the company? 
In determining the merit review standards, we recommend that the 
exchanges examine the complete set of merit review standards in the U.S. 
set forth as “Statements of Policy” by the North American Securities 
Administrators Association (NASAA).63 Many states have adopted one or 
more of those standards and incorporate them into their state review of 
proposed offerings. In addition, approximately twenty states have adopted 
a general standard of merit review that allows administrators to refuse to 
allow a registered offering in that state if the offering is found not to be “fair, 
just and equitable” to potential investors.64 This generalized standard may 
be an appropriate back-up to the more specific merit review standards where 
a company’s financial, management, or historical experience does not lend 
itself precisely to analysis under specific guidelines.  
2. CSRC Disclosure Review 
The current proposal subordinates the CSRC’s authority to review an 
IPO applicant’s disclosures. The primary authority has been delegated to 
 
 
63 Statements of Policy, North AMERICAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION (2017), 
www.nasaa.org/regulatory-activity/statements-of-policy. 
64 A listing of such states and a description of merit review standards adopted in various states in 
the Unites States can be found in STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES COUNSELING FOR SMALL & EMERGING 
COMPANIES §12:8 (Oct. 2017 Update). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/6
  
 
 
 
 
2018]            REFORMING CHINA’S IPO LAWS                    351 
 
 
 
 
the exchanges. The much-reduced role of the CSRC is understandable given 
the CSRC’s history, but the proposal has, we believe, undercut the need for 
careful and experienced review of issuer disclosures.65 We believe, given 
the CSRC’s experience and expertise with regard to disclosure 
requirements, that the CSRC should retain authority to review an applicant’s 
disclosures, raise questions regarding possible inaccurate or incomplete 
statements, require corrected amended disclosure documents, and conduct 
appropriate investigations where disclosures appear to lack completeness or 
credibility. The CSRC should be able to act similarly to the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, which undertakes a comprehensive 
examination of applications to assure that all disclosure requirements have 
been satisfied. The CSRC’s review role should precede and therefore be of 
service to the responsibility accorded to exchanges to conduct their own 
review and analyses of a proposed issuer’s disclosures. Unlike the past, 
however, the CSRC’s role should be limited to disclosure concerns only. 
The ten-day CSRC review role provided in the proposed legislation should 
be limited to disclosure issues that the CSRC believes may not have been 
fully treated by the exchange review. 
3. The Link between an IPO and an Exchange Listing 
An IPO and an exchange listing are distinct commercial activities, 
although the success of the former usually depends heavily on the 
probability of the latter. Currently the CSRC directs where IPO issuers will 
be listed, and all IPOs would go onto one exchange or another. Under the 
proposed registration system, if exchanges are given autonomy to determine 
whether such issuers will enjoy the privileges of listing, it is quite possible 
that many new issuers will not be able to list on an existing exchange. The 
proposed new Securities Law empowers the CSRC to promulgate 
conditions and procedures for IPOs not to be listed in the exchange.66 
We agree with the proposed legislation that distinguishes exchange 
listing from the ability to undertake a registered IPO. Any legitimate 
operating company should have the right to raise capital through a registered 
public offering. That leaves open, however, a principal unresolved question 
of where securities will be traded if an issuer is denied an exchange listing. 
 
 
65 Ironically, the CSRC will retain authority to review and veto proposed offerings of corporate 
bonds. The People’s The People’s Republic of China Securities Law (Revised Draft), supra note 39, at 
35. The issuing process for bonds was perhaps not seen to have as sullied a CSRC history as that of 
ordinary shares. 
66 Id. at 19. 
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One possibility is the so-called “third board,” the National Equities 
Exchange and Quotations limited Company (NEEQ), an over-the-counter 
market launched in 2013 as a new exchange platform in Beijing. However, 
trading in shares listed on NEEQ is limited to accredited investors, a 
substantial handicap to a robust secondary market. Most companies listed 
on NEEQ have engaged in prior private offerings. But the NEEQ has an 
existing framework for accepting IPO companies, as it is mandatory for all 
“unlisted public companies” to be traded in the NEEQ.67 Any company 
which either has more than 200 shareholders accumulatively, even if the 
number of current shareholders is less than 200, or which makes a public 
offer to transfer some if its securities, falls into the category of “unlisted 
public companies.”68 Moreover, all delisted companies from the Shanghai 
or Shenzhen exchanges are moved to the NEEQ.  So, theNEEQ exchange 
has the infrastructure and experience to develop an alternative trading 
market for companies that engaged in registered IPOs but fail to meet 
Shanghai or Shenzhen listing requirements. 
A second alternative is ChiNext, the third tier of the Shenzhen securities 
exchange established in 2009 for smaller companies unable to meet the 
listing qualifications of the exchange’s main and small and medium market 
(SME) tiers.69 ChiNext was created to allow trading in the shares of smaller, 
developing companies. Currently, it’s principal financial requirement is that 
the issuer must have been profitable in the most recent two consecutive 
years, with accumulated profits no less than RMB 10 million Yuan 
(approximately $1.5 million), or the issuer must have been profitable in the 
most recent year with net profits of no less than RMB 5 million and revenues 
of no less than RMB 50 million.70 In our judgment, these standards are too 
strict for many developing companies that have promising prospects but 
have yet to become profitable. This is not consistent with its primary aim of 
serving the start-up (chuangye) companies. It is worth noting that Amazon, 
Inc. had its IPO in 1997 but did not record its first profit until the fourth 
quarter of 2001, a year in which it cumulatively lost $149 million.71 Not all 
 
 
67 CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION, ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR THE 
SUPERVISION OVER UNLISTED PUBLIC COMPANIES, art. 4 (Revised 2013), 
http://hk.lexiscn.com/law/administrative-measures-for-the-supervision-over-unlisted-public-
companies-revised-in-2013.html. 
68 Id. at art. 2. 
69 The listing requirements for the Shenzhen’s main, SME and ChiNext tiers can be found at Listing 
Requirements, SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE, 
http://www.szse.cn/main/en/ListingatSZSE/ListingRequirements/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2018. 
70 In addition, the issuer must have net assets of no less than RMB 20 million at the end of the most 
recent reporting period with no uncovered losses and a total share capital of no less than RMB 30 million 
after the IPO. Id. art. 10.  
 71 For a discussion of Amazon’s history, see Amazon.com, Inc. History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/6
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companies will become success stories like Amazon, but investors should 
not be precluded from investing in companies simply because they have yet 
to show a net profit. We therefore recommend that the Shenzhen exchange 
amend its listing requirements for ChiNext to eliminate the profit 
requirement, an amendment that is consistent with the current proposal that 
eliminates from IPO standards the three-year profit history. 
A third alternative is to allow companies not listed on the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen exchanges to be listed on a provincial exchange center in the 
province where the issuer’s principal office is located. We do not favor this 
alternative over NEEQ or ChiNext, as provincial exchanges centers lack an 
adequate trading infrastructure and the supervisory expertise of the 
established exchanges. However, if neither NEEQ nor ChiNext are prepared 
to amend their current limitations, the provincial exchanges centers are 
likely to become the trading market of last resort for smaller public 
companies. 
With appropriate disclosure and merit review regulation there should be 
no prohibition against public capital raising by high risk companies. Among 
the risk-reducing factors would be the requirements that all publicly-traded 
companies must file periodic reports similar to the Forms 8-K, 10-Q and 10-
K in the United States.72 The Form 10-Q is an especially important 
disclosure document because it provides quarterly financial information, 
thus giving investors a current running account of the company’s financial 
results. In addition, the exchanges should impose a limit on a company’s 
volume of daily trading and price movement as safeguards against volatile 
swings in market price. With appropriate limitations and disclosure 
requirements, China’s securities market can allow for both capital-raising 
by small, developing issuers and for secondary market trading by investors 
willing to invest in what may be high-risk companies. 
4. Eliminate Mandatory IPO Sponsor  
Currently all IPOs approved by the CSRC must have a sponsoring 
underwriter and two sponsor representatives.73 That is not so in the United 
States, where issuers can engage in registered public offerings without an 
underwriter or other sponsor. The principal advantage of mandating a 
 
 
www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/amazon-com-inc-history (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).  
72 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(d) (West)mandates periodic filing requirements for companies who have 
engaged in a public offering and have not less than 300 shareholders.  
 73 Administrative Measures for the Sponsorship of the Issuance and Listing of Securities 
(promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm., Aug, 14, 2008, effective Dec. 1, 2008), art. 48 (China), 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/overRule/Decrees/200910/t20091028_166900.html. 
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sponsoring underwriter is to attempt to assure the quality of the process, 
offering terms and disclosures. Underwriters and other sponsors are 
intended to serve as a check on issuer excesses and unreasonable 
expectations.  
However, the downside is that a mandatory requirement will prevent 
some, perhaps many, smaller and developing companies from raising 
capital if unable to attract a sponsoring underwriter.  For reasons that might 
have little to do with the issuer’s quality, such as lesser broker 
compensation, higher risks relative to commissions, issuer’s location or 
sponsors’ desire for larger, more prestigious clients, securities firms might 
be reluctant to sponsor smaller, fledgling firms.  
We believe that all legitimate operating companies should have the 
opportunity to engage in IPOs to raise needed capital. We recognize that 
this recommendation appears to fly in the face of the “floodgates” concern 
posed by an open registration system. Yet, given the large number of 
companies in China seeking additional capital instead of additional 
burdensome debt, and the limited number of broker-dealer firms that may 
be willing and able to be sponsoring underwriters, we believe that smaller 
companies should not be precluded from raising capital through an IPO 
because of an inability to attract a formal sponsor.74 While their offerings 
are likely to be more difficult to achieve, they should not be prohibited. In 
the United States, smaller companies unable to find or afford underwriters 
can engage in a so-called “direct public offering,” utilizing the internet as 
their primary marketing tool.75 Such offerings are generally not as 
successful as underwritten offerings, but companies that desire to raise 
capital by these means should not be thwarted by the lack of a willing 
sponsor.  
5. Improve Class Action Procedures for Civil Actions 
The Chinese Securities Law has relatively sophisticated provisions 
covering civil liabilities for material misrepresentations (xujiachenshu) 
including false or misleading disclosures and omissions in disclosure 
documents. When there is a proven misrepresentation, established by a 
regulatory sanction or a criminal conviction, which has resulted in a loss to 
 
 
74 This recommendation is consistent with the policy behind the 2002 law promoting small and 
medium-sized businesses, which in Article 16 states that “the state should take measures to broaden the 
channels of direct financing for small and medium-sized enterprises.” Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on the Promotion of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 1, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018) (China) (the statement now appears in Article 
18 after the 2017 revision of the law).  
75 A description of the direct public offering process can be found in COHN, supra note 64, § 4:10.  
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investors, the issuer is liable for the loss thus caused. The directors, 
supervisors, executives, and sponsor/underwriter of the issuer are jointly 
and severally liable for the loss thus caused, unless they can prove that they 
are not at fault.76 
Despite the existence of apparently adequate statutory sanctions, civil 
actions in China are rare. Moreover, directors seem to be treated favorably. 
A study of the sixty-five suits from 2002-2011 found that in only fourteen 
cases natural persons (such as directors) were named as co-defendant 
alongside the companies; in the cases that were settled or mediated by the 
courts, claims against directors and executives were almost invariably 
dropped as a tradeoff for a more favorable settlement plan for the 
plaintiffs.77 
There is no U.S. style class action mechanism in China. There is a 
multiple-party joint suit mechanism in the Civil Procedure Law,78 which 
allows suits without a determined number of claimants at the time the case 
is brought. The court is empowered to issue an announcement notifying 
potential plaintiffs to register with the court. The judgments eventually 
rendered would be binding for all registered plaintiffs registered. This is an 
“opt-in” mechanism, a major difference from the U.S. “opt-out” class 
action. 
Courts rarely employ the plaintiff registration method. Instead, the 
customary way is to divide plaintiffs into small groups of fifteen-twenty 
persons, even when there are thousands of affected investors.79 The case is 
tried in a collective way, but multiple individual cases are filed consisting 
of distinct groups of plaintiff investors. It is uncertain whether this process 
is driven by courts desiring to charge more fees, or because judges simply 
intend to avoid the influx of hundreds of aggrieved litigants in a courtroom, 
 
 
76 The Supreme Court expanded the list of potential defendants to include directors, supervisors, 
managers and other senior management personnel employed by such entities, and market professional 
service agencies (such as accounting firms, law firms, and asset valuation firms) and people working in 
these entities who are directly responsible for the misrepresentation. See SEVERAL PROVISIONS OF THE 
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT REGARDING TRYING CIVIL COMPENSATION CASES ARISING FROM FALSE 
STATEMENT IN SECURITIES MARKET, http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2003/01/id/81833.shtml 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2017) [hereinafter “SEVERAL PROVISIONS”].  
77 Huang, supra note 60, at 788.  
78 Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China Article (2012 Amendment), (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013), art. 54 
(China), available at http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=183386&lib=law. 
79 For example, in the Dongfang Electronics Case, the court accumulatively handled 2,716 suits 
brought by 6,989 plaintiffs individually and in group. See THE 2006 INTERIM TERM REPORT, YANTAI 
DONGFANG ELECTRONICS INFORMATION INDUSTRY CO., LTD. 7(2006), 
http://disclosure.szse.cn/finalpage/2006-08-24/18102574.PDF.  
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potentially posing a threat to sensitive social stability.80 At the same time, 
judges can get impressive records as their workloads are calculated by the 
amount of cases, regardless of magnitude. Though this process has been 
criticized as inefficient,81 in a well-designed proceeding the tribunal could 
adjudicate the case for one exemplary group and then copy, sometimes with 
adjustments for technical measurements of damage, the fact findings for the 
other groups that share the same scenarios.82 When considering the potential 
harm that fraudulent IPOs may cause to the investing public, we believe that 
the development of an effective class action procedure is superior to the 
current system of fragmented and disjointed multiple actions. 
Class action litigation can have a positive effect upon transparency, as 
the potential of a large class action is likely to cause companies to be more 
careful in adhering to their disclosure obligations.83 Although there are 
litigation processes in China that partially emulate the U.S.-type class 
action, the class action process in the United States is far less cumbersome 
and much more inclusive of all potential plaintiffs. The experience in Korea, 
which enacted the Securities Class Action Act in 2003,84 also suggests that 
the risk of frivolous suits is low,85 which would also be the likely result in 
China given similar historical and cultural restraints on litigation.  
Some have argued that a civil action led by an empowered public 
institution is more feasible.86 An example of this form of litigation occurred 
in January 2017 when representatives from the Zhongzheng Medium and 
Small Investor Protection Service Center Limited Liability Company, 
which isa special entity newly founded by the CSRC, appeared in a 
Shanghai Court for its first case helping investors bring a civil case against 
a listed company, potentially pointing towards a new trend in civil 
litigation.87 It is anticipated that the protection center will play an active role 
 
 
80 See Nicholas C. Howson, Corporate Law in the Shanghai People's Courts,1992-2008: Judicial 
Autonomy in a Contemporary Authoritarian State, 5 E. Asia L. REV. 303, 401-07 (2010). 
81 Guo Li &Allan V. Y. Ong, The Fledging Securities Fraud Litigation in China, 39 HONG KONG 
L.J.697, 710-11 (2009). 
82 See Huang, supra note 61 at,783-84. 
83 See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The 
Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 108-111 (2006). 
84 See Bernard Blacket. al., Corporate Governance in Korea at The Millennium: 
Enhancing International Competitiveness (Final Report and Legal Reform Recommendations to 
The Ministry of Justice of The Republic of Korea), 26 J. CORP. L.537, 546 (2001). 
85 See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1507– 
25 (2004). Choi is a Korean American who argued for a less stringent law for class action in Korea. 
86 This is what Taiwan and Singaporean scholars argued for China Mainland and maybe the whole 
East Asia. See Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang &JianLin Chen, Reforming China's Securities Civil Actions: 
Lessons from US’s PSLRA Reform and Taiwan’s Government-Sanctioned Non-Profit Organization, 21 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 115 (2008). 
87 See The First Case of Securities Support Lawsuit in China Opened in Shanghai Today, SINA.COM 
(Jan. 23, 2017), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2017-01-23/doc-ifxzutkf2426490.shtml. Sina.com is a 
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in suing misbehaving listed companies as a surrogate for investors. 
However, this process has two drawbacks. The first is that the Protection 
Service Center is an arm of the CSRC, which therefore has final say as to 
whether litigation will be brought despite investor concerns and desires. The 
second drawback is that such a Center has limited resources and is therefore 
constrained as to the number of actions it can pursue. That is why the notion 
of “the private attorney general” is important, allowing the affected 
investors to act when the government agency will not or cannot. While the 
special litigation entity concept is a step in the right direction to afford 
economic relief to affected investors, it should not be regarded as the 
substitute for private class actions.  
6. Eliminate Prerequisite of an Administrative Sanction for Civil 
Actions 
There is no provision in the Chinese securities or civil procedure laws 
that prohibits a civil action from being brought without prior CSRC or other 
governmental action. However, in practice such a suit would not be 
accepted by a court without a prior administrative punishment or a criminal 
verdict. The courts have given very clear notice of this prerequisite with 
regard to any case based on a material misrepresentation or omission.88 
When the 2001 market decline exposed a string of underlying securities 
scandals and set in motion numerous lawsuits filed against listed companies, 
the Supreme People’s Court instructed that in light of the legal and 
regulatory uncertainties surrounding these cases, lower courts were not to 
hear civil compensation suits, basing its reasoning on the supposed 
unpreparedness and incompetence of such courts.89 
Lacking expertise is not a proper pretext for courts avoiding securities 
cases. In 2002 and 2003, after much criticism for such a denial of access to 
the courts, the Supreme People’s Court partly reversed its position and 
issued guidelines90 providing that investor suits for false or misleading 
 
 
leading news website in China. 
88 SEVERAL PROVISIONS, supra note 75. See also Sanzhu Zhu, Civil Litigation Arising from False 
Statements on China's Securities Market, 31N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 377, 381 (2005). 
89 See NOTICE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT ON REFUSING TO ACCEPT CIVIL COMPENSATION 
CASES INVOLVING SECURITIES FOR THE TIME BEING (2001),http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=16373(English translation available at 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=36895&lib=law); see also Zhiwu Chen, Capital Markets and 
Legal Development: The China Case, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 451(2003). 
90 NOTICE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT ON THE RELEVANT ISSUES CONCERNING THE 
ACCEPTANCE OF CASES OF DISPUTES OVER CIVIL TORT ARISING FROM FALSE STATEMENT IN THE 
SECURITIES MARKET (2002), http://www.law-lib.com/lawhtm/2002/16956.htm. 
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disclosure could be brought, but on the condition that the defendant had 
been administratively sanctioned by the CSRC or other administrative 
agencies or had been found liable in a criminal proceeding.91 
 Curiously, despite administrative sanctions by the CSRC, the potential 
for civil actions in China is far from being fully exploited. In the U.S., a 
high percentage of SEC enforcement actions are accompanied by civil 
actions,92 but in China, even in the cases of CSRC-sanctioned companies 
with actual factual findings of wrongdoing, approximately 85% of such 
eligible easy target companies for investor lawsuits have not been sued, 
according to a study for the period 2001–2006.93 In a similar survey based 
on data from 2002-2011, it was estimated that securities civil actions 
“represent only about 25.7% of all the eligible criminal/administrative 
sanctions. . . .”94 
One principal reason why Chinese investors are reluctant to piggy-back 
onto the public enforcers is that the majority of potential defendants are 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) whose corporate misdeeds may have been 
implicitly permitted by their government controllers. Transfers of wealth of 
listed companies to their SOE parent companies are rooted in the 
government controllers’ desire to utilize the listed companies to serve local 
economies, relieving the local budget of the burden of financing 
investments, and facilitating economic development at the expense of 
investors nationwide. The career prospects of powerful local bureaucrats are 
closely connected with their regions’ performance.95 Punitive judgments 
against SOEs in their jurisdictions obviously would impact not only the 
economic resources ultimately controlled by the local governments, but also 
cast shadows on their ruling abilities. Thus, bureaucrats would act to 
influence courts and reduce enforcement rates against local firms. A further 
concern in China is that the judiciary, especially in significant cases, is 
subject to government interference.96 
 
 
91 SEVERAL PROVISIONS OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT REGARDING TRYING CIVIL 
COMPENSATION CASES ARISING FROM FALSE STATEMENT IN SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 76; see 
also Zhu, supra note 88. 
92 Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49 J.L. 
& ECON. 365, 370(2006);Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC's Compensation of Injured Investors, 
60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1134 (2008) (estimating a ratio of 55%). 
93 Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China’s Securities 
Market, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 942-44 (2008). 
94 Huang, supra note 61, at 766. 
95 See e.g., YASHENG HUANG, INFLATION AND INVESTMENT CONTROLS IN CHINA 27–57, 
(Cambridge University Press 2006).  
96 See e.g., STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 120-21 
(STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1999); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE 
OF LAW 26-28 (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 2002); Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the 
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Although factors that inhibit robust civil actions continue to exist, the 
prerequisite of government sanctions for private civil actions should be 
eliminated. The CSRC and other government agencies are not necessarily 
aggressive or competent prosecutors of financial crimes. As the professional 
regulator, which boasts a higher ratio of Western-educated staff than most 
Chinese ministries, the CSRC may have good intentions but it is ill 
equipped, overworked, subject to resource constraints, and without 
adequate political breathing room.97 Commentators have noted that “[t]he 
institutional and political constraints within which the CSRC operates seem 
apparent,”98 and that the agency often “comes under extensive external 
pressure not to take actions.”99 The CSRC is especially reluctant to take 
enforcement actions against politically-connected SOEs,100 whose 
controllers are government organs or super SOEs groups that may have 
almost as high official rank as the CSRC has in China’s political system. 
Unsurprisingly, an evaluation of administrative punishments given by the 
CSRC from 2001-2006 was deemed to be “modest” against the actual 
severity of the wrongs in the market.101 The number of sanctions actually 
issued by the CSRC looks rather small given the extravagant unpunished, 
frequent, and severe market abuses, while enforced punishments often come 
later, “two or more years after the wrongdoing occurred.”102 
In sum, two factors militate against courts continuing to prohibit civil 
actions in the securities field absent administrative or criminal sanctions. 
One is the relative paucity of actions taken by the CSRC and other agencies, 
which may be due in part to political concerns. A second factor is the lack 
of governmental capacity to pursue all apparently meritorious actions. The 
S.E.C.’s Enforcement Division in the U.S. has approximately 450 attorneys, 
yet even their aggressive enforcement efforts pale in number compared to 
the total amount of civil securities litigation. One may say that there is too 
much private litigation in the U.S., but that notion does not ring true in the 
securities field. Although civil plaintiffs in China may too often fail to 
realize the full potential of utilizing a valid administrative penalty, 
 
 
Chinese Court System: The Enforcement of Civil Judgment,10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 42 (1996) 
(discussing “the dependence of local court personnel upon local government at the same level for their 
jobs and their finances.”). 
97 See Liebman & Milhaupt, supra note 93, at 977. 
98 Id. at 942. 
99 Id. at 955–956. 
100 William T. Allen & HanShen, Assessing China’s Top-Down Securities Markets, (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 16713).  
101 See Liebman & Milhaupt, supra note 93, at 942. 
102 See id.at 955. See Pistor & Xu, supra note 22, at 185.  
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nevertheless we do not see the necessity of setting such a prerequisite for 
private actions.  
7. Improve Liability Provisions for Misleading Prospectus 
Disclosures 
Article 69 of China’s Securities Law103 is the principal liability provision 
regarding misleading statements in a prospectus. It imposes liability upon 
the issuer for losses to investors without regard to fault, and upon directors, 
senior managers, control shareholders, sponsors and underwriters “unless 
one can establish a lack of fault on one’s part.” The strict liability of issuers 
is similar to Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act in the United States,104 
but the Chinese statutory provision fails to impose upon other potential 
defendants an affirmativeduty of due diligence with regard to the review of 
the prospectus. The “lack of fault” phrase in Article 69 may suggest no 
affirmative obligation on the part of each director and all other potential 
defendants to undertake a reasonable investigation into the statements 
contained in the prospectus.  
China’s statutory reference to “lack of fault” contrasts with the U.S. 
requirement that each director and other defendant “had, after reasonable 
investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe . . . that the 
statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a 
material fact. . . .”105 Unlike the U.S. standard, it may be too easy in China 
for those in charge of an issuer’s misleading IPO to avoid personal liability 
for investor losses byshowing that they were too far removed from the 
drafting and review of the misstatements. We recommend that the Securities 
Law be amended to impose a clearer requirement of due diligence upon all 
potential non-issuer defendants. This measure will enhance the obligation 
on directors, senior managers, sponsors, underwriters, and others connected 
with the drafting of the prospectus, likely resulting both in greater 
transparency and fewer fraudulent offerings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 17, §69.  
104 See15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a–77aa. (West). 
105 See Securities Act of 1933 §11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3).   
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8. Create Enforceable Suitability Requirements for Securities 
Dealers 
Stockbrokers and other securities dealers selling shares during an IPO 
should be under both ethical and legal duties to know that their 
recommended investments are suitable for their customers. As noted, the 
great majority of purchasers in an IPO are individual investors. Many such 
investors lack experience and sophistication in the securities market. In the 
future registration system environment, with an expected substantial 
increase in IPOs and investment opportunities, Chinese investors are likely 
to rely increasingly on advice and recommendations from their 
stockbrokers. 
Although substantial reliance may increasingly be placed upon one’s 
stockbroker, brokers are compensated only by sales commissions and are 
therefore in an inherent conflict of interest situation. Because brokers are 
likely to play a major gatekeeper role in the new securities world, it is 
imperative that brokers be subject to appropriate standards of conduct in 
recommending share purchases. Therefore, prior to implementation of the 
open registration system, we recommend that the CSRC assure that all 
brokers and securities dealers are subject to standards and requirements 
analogous to those that apply in the United States, namely suitability and 
knowledge of the securities offerings. As stated in Rule 2111 issued by the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA): 
A member or an associated person must have a reasonable basis to 
believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy 
involving a security or securities is suitable for the customer, based 
on the information obtained through the reasonable diligence of the 
member or associated person to ascertain the customer's investment 
profile. A customer's investment profile includes, but is not limited 
to, the customer's age, other investments, financial situation and 
needs, tax status, investment objectives, investment experience, 
investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and any 
other information the customer may disclose to the member or 
associated person in connection with such recommendation.106 
Suitability requirements can be an important safeguard for investors, 
protecting them against broker recommended purchases that are 
inappropriate due to the investor’s age, inexperience, investment goals, or 
 
 
106 FINRA, RULE 2111 (2014).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
362 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 17:327 
 
 
 
economic condition. In light of the concern that the open registration system 
will result in many low-quality offerings, a well-defined and enforced 
suitability standard may act as one safeguard against inappropriate broker 
recommendations and investor purchases. Failure to adhere to the suitability 
standards in the U.S. can lead to civil liability by the broker for losses 
incurred and disciplinary action by FINRA. We recommend that similar 
results obtain in China.  
9. Increase Training of Prosecutors, Lawyers, and Judges 
An effective enforcement system requires competent prosecutors, 
lawyers and judges who understand the securities laws and their appropriate 
application. Currently in China such competence is quite limited, especially 
outside major metropolitan areas. During this period prior to adoption of 
securities reform, and thereafter on a regular basis, we recommend that 
periodic formal training sessions be developed for prosecutors, lawyers and 
judges. Without such increased understanding and competence levels 
among those involved principally in enforcement procedures, enforcement 
levels will not keep pace with investor needs. On a positive note there has 
been an increase in the teaching of finance and securities matters in Chinese 
universities. It will take time, however, for a substantial and experienced 
securities bar to develop. Meanwhile, potential issuers and investors will 
have growing needs for adequate professional advice and guidance.  
CONCLUSION 
China is on the cusp of major securities reform for the deregulation of 
public offerings. The reform will allow greater access to capital markets for 
numerous young companies. Yet, current proposals appear inadequate and 
not fully articulated, given the anticipated substantial increase in companies 
seeking capital through registered IPOs. Notwithstanding the demerits 
regarding the CSRC’s veto power over the IPO process, removing all 
barriers to the registration process would be a mistake. The Chinese 
securities market has experienced several major crises in its relatively short 
period of existence. The move to an open registration system is a healthy 
step for China’s capital markets but must be accompanied by sufficient 
safeguards and policies consistent with the twin goals of capital access and 
investor protection.  
There is enormous potential in China’s securities market for growing 
companies and for expanding investor opportunities. At the same time, 
because of the domination of the Chinese securities markets by small, 
individual investors, and the enormous diversity of size and quality likely 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/6
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among companies that will be undertaking IPOs, we have recommended a 
series of measures that should be implemented prior to, or concurrent with 
the open registration reform. The reforms in China cannot and should not 
emulate the securities laws and regulations in the United States. Differences 
in history, practice, and political factors require accommodation to the 
singular characteristics of the respective markets. Yet, much is to be learned 
from the U.S. experience. Our recommendations, including merit review 
and stronger private enforcement capacities, are based on that experience. 
China’s reform is a work in progress. Before any open registration measures 
are implemented, additional reform elements along the recommended lines 
are necessary to create and sustain an efficient and viable securities market.  
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